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Executive Summary
The authors revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent 
Commons” (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented 
environmentally friendly technologies following 
its discontinuation in 2016. Established in January 
2008 by several large multinational companies, 
the not-for-profit initiative provided royalty-
free access to 248 patents covering 94 “green” 
inventions. In previous work, Bronwyn Hall 
and Christian Helmers (2013) suggested that 
the patents pledged to the commons had the 
potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable 
environmentally friendly technologies. The 
updated results in this paper now show that 
the commons did not increase the diffusion of 
pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered 
from a number of structural and organizational 
issues. The authors hope these findings will inform 
future efforts to make environmentally friendly 
technologies more broadly available for use.
Introduction
Although patents give their owners the right 
to exclude others from practising a patented 
technology, or to charge them for the privilege 
of doing so, an increasing number of firms have 
begun to make voluntary pledges intended to 
limit their ability to enforce their patents to the 
fullest degree (Contreras 2015). Yet the pledging 
of patents, even to the extent that they will not 
be asserted against infringers, stops short of 
abandoning or contributing them to the public 
domain.1 Thus, under a pledge model, patent assets 
are retained by their owners, who continue to 
incur maintenance and other fees, but the offensive 
use of such patents is significantly curtailed.
Patent pledges are made for a variety of reasons, 
including the promotion of broad product 
interoperability through common technical 
standards, the advocacy of new technology 
1 Several large patent holders, including IBM, have a well-articulated 
strategy for abandoning unused patents (Crouch 2012). Other 
coordinated industry efforts, in particular in the biomedical sector, have 
contributed substantial intellectual property (IP) assets to the public 
domain for a variety of reasons (Contreras 2014).
platforms and the pursuit of social goals (ibid.). 
Over the past few decades, significant patent 
pledges have been made in areas such as open-
source software (for example, IBM, Sun, Google 
and Red Hat have each pledged that they will not 
assert hundreds of patents against open-source 
software implementations), electric vehicles 
(Tesla’s famous proclamation that “all our patents 
are belong to you” [sic]), and biotechnology (for 
example, Monsanto’s pledge not to assert patents 
covering genetically modified seeds against 
farmers inadvertently growing them) (Contreras 
2015; Reynolds, Contreras and Sarnoff 2017). 
The EcoPC was an innovative not-for-profit 
initiative undertaken by a group of large 
industrial firms with the goal of pledging “green 
technology” patents for broad, royalty-free use 
in addressing environmental challenges. The 13 
EcoPC participants collectively pledged a total of 
248 “green technology” patents (94 priority patents 
or distinct inventions) to the EcoPC between its 
formation in 2008 and its discontinuation in 2016.
The EcoPC had the ambitious objective of 
promoting the diffusion of green technologies to 
increase and accelerate adoption and to encourage 
follow-on innovation. Following its creation, the 
EcoPC attracted substantial attention in both the 
scholarly literature (Mattioli 2012; Hall and Helmers 
2013; Awad 2015; Contreras 2015) and the popular 
media (Tripsas 2009). In addition to accolades, 
the EcoPC attracted some skepticism regarding 
its potential effectiveness. The skepticism focused 
on whether such a commons could offer sufficient 
incentives to attract valuable patent pledges and 
thereby achieve its ambitious goals. In contrast to 
other mechanisms designed to share patents, such 
as cross-licensing and patent pools, patent owners 
in the EcoPC committed to maintain ownership 
of their patents, which is costly, while making 
those patents freely accessible to third parties, 
including competitors.2 For these reasons, it was 
not obvious what benefits the commons offered 
to participants beyond reputational enhancement. 
This in turn meant that participants could have 
had incentives to minimize their costs by pledging 
only patents with little commercial value and 
allowing them to lapse shortly after they were 
pledged. A second possible benefit might be that 
2 Some competitive safeguards were left in place, notably a defensive 
termination right in case a different patent was asserted against the 
pledger by another firm using the patented technology.
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those building on these technologies might find 
other (commercial) outputs of the contributing 
firm useful, or might add to a knowledge 
base from which the firm would benefit.3
In an earlier study (Hall and Helmers 2013), two of 
the authors of this paper studied the characteristics 
of the patents pledged to the EcoPC. This study 
confirmed that the pledged patents did claim 
environmentally friendly technologies. Moreover, 
pledged patents were of similar value to other 
patents in the pledging firm’s portfolio, but of 
lower value than other patents in their class, 
using the usual patent value indicators (based 
on citations, family size, number of International 
Patent Classifications [IPCs], etc.). The findings 
suggested that the EcoPC participants had in 
fact pledged patents with the potential to diffuse 
environmentally friendly technologies that were 
potentially useful, but there was little evidence 
of such diffusion in the patent data itself. 
In order to study whether the EcoPC increased 
the diffusion of green technologies, Hall and 
Helmers (2013) looked for changes in forward 
citations to pledged patents following their 
addition to the commons. They constructed a set 
of control patents that matched the publication 
authorities, priority years and IPC classes of the 
EcoPC patents, adding to these control patents all 
their equivalents, that is, the filings that shared 
a priority application with them. They examined 
the pattern of citations by subsequent patent 
applications to the set of EcoPC patents and their 
controls over time, before and after contribution, 
and found that the EcoPC patents tended to be 
cited less than the patents in the control group 
before contribution to the EcoPC. However, the 
results after contribution were inconclusive, 
because most of the patents were contributed in 
late 2008 and there was little data post-pledge as 
citation data was available only through early 2012. 
In the current study, the authors revisit the effect 
of the EcoPC on technology diffusion and assess 
its impact more broadly, using two different 
approaches. The first is a set of interviews with 
participants in the EcoPC and those responsible for 
it, described in the “Qualitative Analysis” section. 
The second is an updated look at the data on the 
patents pledged to the EcoPC, described mainly 
3 Sharon Belenzon (2006) showed that focal firm citations to patents are 
positively valued by the market, suggesting this kind of feedback effect 
from others’ use of the firm’s technology.
in the fourth and fifth sections. With the passage 
of time, more citation data has become available 
(through 2016, as opposed to early 2012 in Hall and 
Helmers [2013]). This allows the authors of this 
paper to re-examine the data and provide a more 
definitive answer to the question of whether the 
commons had any effect on technology diffusion. 
The fact that the commons was discontinued 
in 2016 also motivates the authors to revisit the 
viability of such patent commons more generally. 
To summarize the paper’s main findings, the 
authors do not find any evidence that the EcoPC 
increased the diffusion of pledged patents. Pledged 
patents are cited less than the matched control 
patents before they enter the commons and 
their pledge does not change this. Looking at the 
EcoPC priority patents, 82 percent had lapsed by 
July 2017 due to expiration (26 percent), rejection 
or withdrawal (18 percent), or nonpayment 
of renewal fees (38 percent). This indicates 
that participating companies, in most cases, 
did not consider the benefits of the commons 
sufficiently large to maintain the patents in force, 
and expired patents were not replaced by new 
patent pledges. The authors’ interviews with 
representatives of the EcoPC participants reveal 
several common critiques of the EcoPC’s structure 
and operational processes, in particular its inability 
to provide information regarding the usage of 
contributed technologies.4 These are discussed 
in greater detail in the third section, below. 
This study both updates the authors’ previous 
work and fills gaps in the understanding 
of the functioning and performance of the 
EcoPC and patent commons more generally. 
Providing a definitive answer to the question 
of diffusion, and the functioning of the EcoPC 
more broadly, is important for several reasons. 
First, it offers insight regarding the manner in 
which patent pledges can support the diffusion 
and implementation of (green) technologies 
around the world. Second, it can inform the 
design of other pledge communities, in both the 
environmental space and other key technology 
areas, such as biotechnology and agriculture.
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. The next section reviews the institutional 
design and history of the EcoPC. The “Findings” 
4 This feature also limits the authors’ ability to study their subsequent use, 
which is why the authors chose to focus on citations to these patents, 
which is public data.
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section summarizes the results from the authors’ 
interviews of participants in the EcoPC. In the 
“Data” and “Empirical Results” sections, the 
authors turn to an updated quantitative analysis of 
these patents and their citations. The last section 
offers conclusions in the form of a few lessons 
that emerge from the authors’ analysis for the 
design and functioning of patent commons. 
The Eco-Patent Commons: 
Structure and Development5
The conception of the EcoPC as a collective 
mechanism for permitting broad usage of patents 
covering environmental technologies was originally 
developed by IBM in the mid-2000s as one of 
several corporate initiatives directed toward 
environmental protection and sustainability (IBM 
2010). Given IBM’s well-known patent strength,6 a 
program to promote environmental causes would 
capitalize on one of the company’s principal assets. 
As noted above, IBM had already made significant 
commitments to the sharing of patents and 
other IP in the area of open-source code software 
(Merges 2004; Wen, Ceccagnoli and Forman 
2013; Contreras 2015). Accordingly, extending 
these initiatives to the environmental area was 
consistent with IBM’s existing corporate culture.7
The animating theory behind the EcoPC is that 
industrial firms with large patent portfolios 
likely hold patents covering technologies with 
environmental applications, but because those 
technologies are not core to the firms’ business, 
they are languishing unused. If, however, the 
patents covering these technologies could be made 
5 The material in this section is derived from the works cited and the 
interviews described in the “Findings” section. Additional information 
regarding the organization and history of the EcoPC can be found in 
Mattioli (2012), Hall and Helmers (2013) and Awad (2015).
6 According to statistics from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
IBM regularly receives more US patent grants than any other company in 
the world (about 7,000 to 9,000 patents per year in 2014–2017).
7 The EcoPC explicitly compared itself to the open-source movement, 
noting in its promotional materials, “As has been demonstrated by the 
open source software community, the free sharing of knowledge can 
provide a fertile ground for new collaboration and innovation. Sharing 
environmental patents can help others become more eco-efficient 
and operate in a more environmentally sustainable manner, enabling 
technology innovation to meet social innovation” (EcoPC 2017).
freely available to users around the world, then a 
significant public service could be rendered at a 
minimal cost to the patent holder. Thus, the hope is 
not that the patent holder will find a “Rembrandt in 
the attic” that will render it a substantial financial 
return, but that it will find a box of old baby clothes 
that could benefit others at little cost to the owner.8
IBM publicly announced the concept for the EcoPC 
at its Global Innovation Outlook conference in 
2006 (IBM 2008). The company then initiated 
discussions with other large firms with which it 
had existing business ties and which it believed 
might be sympathetic to a collective approach to 
making environmental technologies more broadly 
available. In January 2008, IBM announced the 
launch of the EcoPC together with Nokia, Pitney 
Bowes and Sony (IBM 2008). A total of 13 firms 
joined the EcoPC as summarized in Table 1. The 
stated mission of the EcoPC was “to manage a 
collection of patents pledged for unencumbered 
use by companies and intellectual property rights 
holders around the world to make it easier and 
faster to innovate and implement industrial 
processes that improve and protect the global 
environment” (EcoPC 2013). Accordingly, patents 
eligible for inclusion in the EcoPC were required 
to belong to one of 60 enumerated IPC codes9 
relating to environmental or sustainability 
technology. Technologies sought by the EcoPC 
included those aimed at energy conservation, 
pollution control, environmentally friendly 
materials, water or materials use or reduction 
and recyclability (EcoPC 2013). As discussed in 
greater detail in the “Empirical Results” section, 
below, 248 patents were pledged to the EcoPC, 
with the last such contribution occurring in 2011.10
To pledge a patent to the EcoPC, the owner 
was required to make an irrevocable covenant 
not to assert the patent — or “any worldwide 
counterparts” (EcoPC 2013) — against any infringing 
machine, manufacture, process or composition 
of matter that “reduces/eliminates natural 
resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste 
generation or pollution, or otherwise provides 
8 See Rivette and Kline (2000), using IBM as an example of a firm that has 
extracted significant financial value from licensing otherwise “unused” patents.
9 The IPC system was established by the 1971 Strasbourg Agreement 
Concerning the International Patent Classification. It divides technologies 
into eight principal sections with approximately 70,000 subcategories.
10 This number is arrived at as follows: there were 238 patents pledged at 
the time of the authors’ work in Hall and Helmers (2013). Since then, 
Hewlett-Packard added nine and Hitachi added one, for a total of 248.
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environmental benefit(s)” (EcoPC 2013). This being 
said, contributing patent owners retained the 
right to assert pledged patents against any EcoPC 
participant that asserted any environmental 
patent against them, or any non-EcoPC participant 
that asserted any patent against them (ibid.).11 
The initial administrator of the EcoPC was the 
WBCSD, a Geneva-based non-governmental 
organization focused on environmental and 
sustainability issues. The WBCSD is supported 
in part by dues paid by corporate members. As a 
significant member of the WBCSD, IBM persuaded 
the organization to serve as the focal point for 
the EcoPC. The WBCSD’s initial duties in this 
regard consisted primarily of hosting the EcoPC 
website and promoting the EcoPC to other WBCSD 
members for recruitment purposes. The WBCSD 
publicized the EcoPC among its members and 
attracted several of the participants that joined 
following the EcoPC’s formation (see Table 1).
11 This is a so-called “defensive termination” provision.
Participation in the EcoPC was open to all 
individuals and companies in the world; the only 
requirement for participation was the pledging 
of one or more patents according to the EcoPC’s 
rules.12 Neither membership in the WBCSD nor 
any additional dues or charges were required 
for EcoPC participation, a characteristic that 
some have identified as a weakness of the EcoPC 
(see the “Findings” section, below). The EcoPC 
itself was characterized as an unincorporated, 
non-profit association (EcoPC 2013).
Alhough various governance procedures are 
built into the EcoPC’s ground rules, it appears 
that few of these procedures were actually 
observed in practice. For example, the ground 
rules provide for an executive board charged 
with management and leadership of the group. 
Executive board members were to be appointed 
based on a majority vote of EcoPC members 
for two-year terms and were supposed to meet 
12 Members of the EcoPC were required to complete a membership 
application/pledge form, which bound them to comply with the EcoPC’s  
non-assertion pledge, ground rules and governance structure (EcoPC 2013a).
Table 1: Firm Participation in the EcoPC
Firm Date Joining EcoPC Number of Patents Pledged*
IBM January 14, 2008 29
Nokia January 14, 2008 1
Pitney Bowes January 14, 2008 2
Sony January 14, 2008 4
Bosch September 8, 2008 24
DuPont** September 8, 2008 11
Xerox September 8, 2008 13
Taisei March 23, 2009 2
Ricoh March 23, 2009 1
Dow October 20, 2009 1
Fuji Xerox October 20, 2009 2
Hewlett-Packard July 1, 2010 3
Hitachi** July 25, 2011 1
* Priority patents (patent families)
** DuPont and Hitachi withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013, as of the transfer of management from the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) to the Environmental Law Institute (ELI).
Source: EcoPC 2013b, 2017 and ecopatentcommons.org.
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quarterly by telephone and annually in person. 
However, of those individuals that the authors of 
this paper interviewed, none recalled voting on 
EcoPC-related matters and they recalled only a 
handful of telephone conferences and no in-person 
meetings. In effect, the EcoPC appears to have been 
managed in a minimal manner by the WBCSD, with 
business-related decisions made largely by IBM.
In 2013, the administration of the EcoPC was 
transferred from the WBCSD to the ELI, a 
Washington, DC-based trade and advocacy 
organization. This transition was apparently 
orchestrated by IBM, which had withdrawn as a 
member of the WBCSD, thereby eliminating the 
primary driver of the WBCSD’s involvement. The 
WBCSD had also begun to view the EcoPC — which 
could be seen as treating patents as obstacles to be 
overcome in promoting sustainable development 
— as misaligned with the generally pro-IP stance 
of many of its members. The WBCSD thus willingly 
parted with the EcoPC after IBM’s withdrawal 
from the organization. The ELI, of which IBM was a 
significant member, hosted the EcoPC website from 
2013 through 2016, but was not actively engaged in 
recruiting new participants. Two members, Hitachi 
and DuPont, withdrew from the EcoPC at the 
time of this administrative shift. No new patents 
were contributed to the EcoPC after 2011, when 
Hitachi joined. By 2016, very little activity was 
occurring at the EcoPC. Accordingly, in 2016, the 
EcoPC was formally discontinued (EcoPC 2016).13
Although the EcoPC has been shut down, 
the ELI has, throughout the writing of this 
paper, continued to host the EcoPC website at 
ecopatentcommons.org. In addition, pursuant 
to the EcoPC ground rules and pledge terms, the 
“irrevocable” non-assertion pledge made with 
respect to each pledged patent will continue 
in accordance with its terms indefinitely.14
13 Based on the interviews described in the “Findings” section, below, the 
authors understand that each EcoPC participant was consulted by IBM 
regarding the decision to wind down the EcoPC. Apparently, there was 
no resistance to this course of action.
14 The ground rules make it clear that a patent owner’s EcoPC pledge 
will survive that owner’s withdrawal from the EcoPC (EcoPC 2013a): 
“Voluntary or involuntary withdrawal shall not affect the non-assert as to 
any approved pledged patent(s) — the non-assert survives and remains 
in force.” For example, Hitachi pledged a patent to the EcoPC in 2011, 
but withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013. This patent should remain pledged. 
See Contreras (2015, 598).
Qualitative Analysis
This section of the paper describes the 
results of the authors’ interviews of some 
of the participants in the EcoPC.
Methodology
Using a series of semi-structured interviews,15 
the authors sought to gain an understanding 
of the motivations that originally led firms to 
participate in the EcoPC, their assessment of 
the EcoPC’s strengths and weaknesses during 
the course of its operation, and their rationales 
for discontinuing the EcoPC in 2016.
As noted in this paper’s introduction, the EcoPC 
included 13 corporate participants. It was hosted 
by the WBCSD from 2008 to 2013, and by the ELI 
from 2013 to 2016. The authors identified individuals 
employed by EcoPC corporate participants 
who had been personally involved with their 
employer’s decision to join the EcoPC and/or its 
ongoing participation in the EcoPC. Through online 
searches and informal inquiries, current contact 
details for representatives of nine of the 13 EcoPC 
corporate participants were obtained. Seven of 
these individuals consented to be interviewed for 
this study (five by telephone and two by written 
correspondence).16 In addition, representatives of 
the WBCSD and the ELI who were directly involved 
in EcoPC activities were interviewed. Interview 
scripts differed for individuals representing 
EcoPC participants versus administrators. Each 
interview lasted approximately 30 to 60 minutes. 
Responses were coded by the interviewer. No 
compensation was offered to interview subjects. 
The authors do not claim that the information 
gathered through these interviews is necessarily 
representative of the views held by all member 
companies of the EcoPC. It is possible that 
interviewees agreed to be interviewed based on 
their own subjective views of the performance 
of the EcoPC (for example, those that had more 
15 Interviews were conducted by Jorge Contreras pursuant to a 
determination of “no human subject research” by the University of Utah 
Institutional Review Board (26 June 2017, IRB 00102447). Interview 
subject information is held by Contreras.
16 The authors have agreed not to disclose the identities of either the 
individuals interviewed or the EcoPC participant companies that they 
represented, with the exception of IBM, given its central role in forming 
and managing the EcoPC.
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positive views of the EcoPC may have agreed 
to be interviewed). That said, information was 
gathered from a relatively diverse sampling 
of company representatives (relative to the 
number of people involved in the project) across 
different geographical regions (companies 
based in the United States, Europe and Japan). 
The authors are therefore optimistic that these 
interviews offer relevant information with 
regard to a significant portion of the EcoPC 
participants’ views regarding the organization.
Findings
Each interview subject responded to questions 
relating to his or her employer’s reasons for 
joining the EcoPC, how patents were selected for 
inclusion in the EcoPC, the company’s ongoing 
engagement with the EcoPC, views regarding the 
discontinuation of the EcoPC, the company’s overall 
satisfaction with the EcoPC, whether the company’s 
goals in joining the EcoPC were achieved, and 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
EcoPC structure. In addition, representatives of 
the WBCSD and the ELI were asked questions 
relating to their operation and management of the 
EcoPC. These responses are summarized below.
Joining EcoPC
Based on the sample of EcoPC participants 
interviewed, it appears that the primary drive to 
participate in the EcoPC came from management 
within each corporation’s environmental, 
sustainability or corporate social responsibility 
unit (for convenience, the paper will refer to 
such business units as “environmental and 
social responsibility” or ESR). Although in most 
cases, the corporate legal or IP department 
was consulted, it was not the primary internal 
champion of participation in the EcoPC. In 
several cases, the decision to join the EcoPC 
was made by an executive or manager within 
the ESR unit, with the legal department being 
involved only later (for example, to help 
identify suitable patents for contribution). 
Given the origin of EcoPC participation in corporate 
ESR units, it is not surprising that the rationales 
for joining the EcoPC were largely focused on 
improving global environmental conditions and 
sustainability. Several respondents mentioned a 
corporate culture of ESR, while a few expressed 
a desire to ensure that environmentally valuable 
technologies were made available in the 
developing world. Responses evoked themes of 
environmental preservation and stewardship, 
as well as of corporate social responsibility.
With respect to each of the corporate EcoPC 
participants other than IBM, the company was 
approached directly by a representative of either 
IBM or the WBCSD regarding participation 
in the EcoPC. In several cases, a personal 
relationship at the managerial or executive 
level facilitated the decision to participate.
One attractive feature that weighed in favour of 
joining the EcoPC was the lack of any financial 
commitment on the part of the participants. 
The only requirement for EcoPC participation 
was the identification and contribution of one 
or more patents. Several respondents indicated 
that their employers would probably not have 
joined the EcoPC had a membership fee been 
required. Probably due to the lack of a financial 
commitment, the corporate approval required 
for joining the EcoPC was, in some cases, 
handled at the level of the ESR unit. In at least 
one case, however, the company was required to 
obtain corporate approval at the board level.
It is interesting to note that none of the individuals 
who were interviewed identified a public 
relations (PR) benefit as a principal justification 
for joining the EcoPC. While several interviewees 
acknowledged that positive PR associated with 
the EcoPC may have contributed to the decision 
to join, in particular at the executive level, the 
principal support for EcoPC participation within 
firms originated in, and was championed by, 
ESR business units with express goals directed 
at environmental sustainability. This observation 
runs counter to several prior analyses of the 
EcoPC, which speculated that PR benefits may 
have been significant motivators for firms to join 
(Contreras 2015, 591; Van Hoorebeek and Onzivu 
2010, 18). Indeed, even the promotional materials 
created by the WBCSD to recruit additional EcoPC 
members emphasize these PR benefits.17 Yet, it 
seems that PR may have played a relatively modest 
role in the decision of firms to join the EcoPC.
17 See EcoPC (2013b, 3) listing “global recognition” as the first “benefit” for 
member companies that have pledged patents to the EcoPC.
7Assessing the Effectiveness of the Eco-Patent Commons
Selection of Patents
It was a starting premise of most firms that 
the patents pledged to the EcoPC would not 
be central to the firm’s commercial interests. 
In fact, this feature was a “selling point” for 
membership in the commons: the patents 
that would be contributed were not expected 
to “represent an essential source of business 
advantage” for their owners (EcoPC 2017).
The manner in which specific patents were 
selected for contribution to the EcoPC varied 
among participants. IBM, reputedly the largest 
patent holder in the world, utilized a variety of 
internal searching and analysis tools to determine 
which of its patents were suitable candidates for 
contribution: namely that they fit into the EcoPC’s 
approved technology categories and were not 
actively being commercialized by IBM. Other firms 
used similarly sophisticated patent searching 
methodologies, including analysis of external 
citations to patent documents, to determine 
whether patents had potential financial value. 
Some firms, even those with large patent portfolios, 
used less formal approaches. In one case, a patent 
was identified because a senior environmental 
manager at the company was named as an inventor 
on it. Another company asked its internal managers 
at the product division level to recommend 
patents for contribution. At one company, the 
majority of patents contributed originated within 
the ESR business unit, which championed EcoPC 
membership within the company. In all cases, 
EcoPC participants selected patents for contribution 
through internal mechanisms and did not engage 
external consultants or attorneys to assist with 
the search or selection process, which also helped 
keep the costs of participating in the EcoPC low.
Ongoing Engagement
All respondents indicated that a meaningful, 
although not overwhelming, amount of effort was 
required at the initiation of EcoPC participation, 
largely to identify relevant patents to contribute. 
After that initial determination was made, however, 
most firms (IBM being the notable exception) 
indicated that they engaged very little with the 
EcoPC. As noted above, there were occasional 
telephone conferences during which participants 
were updated regarding the EcoPC’s activities, 
but after 2011, when the last new member 
joined, there was little in the way of updates. As 
noted earlier, none of the individuals that were 
interviewed recalled participating in any formal 
vote of EcoPC members, even when the decision 
to wind down the organization was made. This 
being said, most of the respondents did not object 
to this minimal level of involvement and did not 
feel the need to be involved to a greater degree.
Discontinuation
Each respondent was satisfied with the decision 
to wind down the EcoPC, indicating that the 
organization had run its course and provided 
comparatively little value by the time that it 
concluded. None of the respondents expressed 
disappointment or disagreement with the decision 
to discontinue the EcoPC. In fact, at least three 
respondents were unaware, at the time they were 
interviewed, that the EcoPC had been discontinued 
more than a year earlier, demonstrating that, 
at least in these cases, the EcoPC was a fairly 
insignificant activity for these companies.
Strengths and Weaknesses 
of the EcoPC
Most respondents viewed the EcoPC as a 
valuable demonstration of corporate willingness 
to collaborate to achieve environmental and 
sustainability goals. The PR benefits of EcoPC 
participation were viewed as valuable by some 
companies. IBM’s efforts at organizing the project 
were also commended by several respondents. 
However, each of the respondents expressed 
dissatisfaction with at least some aspects 
of the EcoPC, as described below.
 → Membership and recruitment: At its height in 
2011, the EcoPC had 13 corporate participants. 
Although these firms were all major global 
enterprises with large patent portfolios, they 
still represented only a tiny fraction of the total 
potential membership in the organization. In 
particular, given that the EcoPC charged no 
membership fee, it was somewhat puzzling 
that so few firms joined. While the WBCSD 
appeared to promote membership in the 
EcoPC, few of the WBCSD’s many members 
elected to join. Based on interviews with EcoPC 
members, the authors believe that possible 
impediments to recruitment included the 
perceived difficulty and expense of identifying 
suitable patents for contribution; a belief 
among potential members that they lacked 
patents that were suitable for contribution; and 
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a general aversion to the idea of contributing 
potentially valuable patents to the EcoPC 
without compensation, a view generally held 
by legal and IP departments, although not 
shared by ESR business units. Accordingly, 
EcoPC membership may have been limited 
to those large firms with ESR business units 
having sufficient internal authority, willingness 
and social capital to cause their companies 
to join an effort viewed, at least initially, with 
suspicion by corporate legal departments.
 → No tracking of usage: All respondents observed 
that there was no effective way to determine 
whether the technologies covered by patents 
pledged to the EcoPC had been utilized.18 
As a result, it was difficult for them to draw 
conclusions regarding whether the EcoPC was 
worth the effort and to determine whether the 
goals of improving environmental conditions 
and sustainability were being met. Moreover, 
without clear success metrics, it was difficult to 
justify ongoing participation within the EcoPC 
to upper management at some companies. 
Several respondents indicated that the EcoPC 
made a conscious decision not to require 
users to register with the website or report 
back to the EcoPC, as it was felt that such 
requirements would serve as barriers to use 
of the website. Running somewhat counter to 
these comments, one interviewee noted that, 
in the early phase of the EcoPC, he/she received 
informal approaches from potential users 
seeking to understand the technology that had 
been made available through the EcoPC. This 
respondent indicated that during group calls 
with EcoPC representatives, they would share 
information regarding how many inquiries of 
this nature they had received. However, such 
informal inquiries dropped off after the initial 
years of the EcoPC, which may suggest that the 
technologies were no longer perceived as useful. 
The WBCSD, at least initially, tracked hits to 
the EcoPC website and shared this information 
with the participants.19 However, as noted 
above, identifying information about visitors 
was not collected, and it was not clear whether 
18 This weakness was identified by commentators soon after the EcoPC’s 
formation (Bowman 2009).
19 The authors analyzed the data on web hits in their earlier study to find 
a highly skewed distribution of hits: only 36 patents received any hits. 
Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a positive correlation between 
web hits and forward citations by other patents (Hall and Helmers 2013).
visitors were academics, students, attorneys, 
journalists or potential users of technology.
 → Website not user-friendly: It was noted 
by several interview respondents that the 
cataloguing of patents on the EcoPC website, 
which was organized by contributing 
company rather than by technology area, was 
not particularly intuitive or informative. It 
required potential users to look up the relevant 
patents one by one in order to understand the 
technology being offered. Moreover, usually 
only a single patent family member was listed, 
requiring users to identify the remaining 
members themselves. This procedure would 
have required substantial effort on the part 
of potential users, as well as a high degree of 
familiarity with the format and terminology 
of patent documents.20 Perhaps some form 
of usage testing or assessment could have 
helped the organizers of the EcoPC make the 
technology being offered more accessible 
or understandable. As documented by Hall 
and Helmers (2013), the website also listed a 
number of erroneous patent numbers, another 
potential source of frustration for users. 
 → No technology transfer: Another issue raised 
by several respondents was that the EcoPC 
sought to promote the dissemination of 
green technologies through patents alone. 
Yet, complex technologies often cannot be 
understood and implemented, especially 
by non-experts working in the developing 
world, exclusively through patent disclosures 
(McManis and Contreras 2014). Some form of 
technology assistance or transfer is generally 
required to enable local users to take advantage 
of patented technologies, or even to realize 
that such technologies are available and 
applicable to local problems. Thus, even with 
a more explicit statement describing the 
technology covered by the contributed patents, 
it is not clear that the EcoPC would have 
achieved significant technology transfer. One 
of the issues that emerged in this regard was 
uncertainty regarding the intended users of 
the EcoPC system. Who was expected to read 
the EcoPC patents and then employ them in 
environmentally friendly technologies? Several 
20 It is worth pointing out that this situation is changing rapidly, since Google 
patent search now includes members of the patent family in its results. 
However, this feature was not available during most of the life of the 
EcoPC. 
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of the individuals interviewed believed that 
intended users of EcoPC technology would 
be from the developing world. However, this 
belief evidences a misunderstanding of the 
global patent system. Patents prevent usage 
of a patented technology only in the countries 
where patents are issued. Most companies do 
not seek patent protection in the least-developed 
countries, either because protection is uncertain 
in those countries, or because their markets are 
underdeveloped and the cost of procuring patent 
protection is not viewed as cost-effective. Even 
in middle-income countries, multinationals 
tend to focus on pharmaceutical patenting and 
patenting in specific areas where the country 
in question is competitive (Hall and Helmers 
2017; Abud et al. 2013). Accordingly, many 
technologies that are patented in the developed 
world are not patented in the developing world. 
This general rule certainly applies to the patents 
contributed to the EcoPC, most of which have 
“family” members throughout the developed 
world, such as North America, Europe and Asia 
Pacific, but few, if any, patent family members 
in the developing world. Thus, organizations 
in the developing world already have the right 
to seek to exploit many technologies disclosed 
in patents filed in the developed world. But 
they do not do so because, as discussed above, 
the utilization of even moderately complex 
technologies is not possible without significant 
training and technology transfer activity that is 
not accomplished through the grant of patent 
rights alone. In addition, technologies patented 
in the developed world may not be targeted to 
needs in the developing world without extensive 
further development. Ironically, the entities 
that would have most benefited from the non-
assertion covenants made by EcoPC members 
were sophisticated firms in developed countries. 
At least one representative acknowledged 
this, noting that the most likely user of some 
of the company’s contributed patents would 
be environmental service companies. Yet 
because the EcoPC made no concerted outreach 
to promote the availability of contributed 
technologies, even sophisticated firms were 
unlikely to find and use these technologies.
 → Shift in corporate priorities: Several interview 
respondents noted that internal corporate 
support for ESR initiatives within their own 
companies had flagged during the life of 
the EcoPC, and that budgetary and resource 
constraints had resulted in a de-emphasis 
of ESR initiatives within their corporate 
organizations. Some speculated that these 
industry-wide trends may have affected the 
willingness of new members to join the EcoPC.
Data
For the purpose of the authors’ quantitative analysis 
in the section, below, they updated the database 
used in Hall and Helmers (2013). This means that 
for comparison purposes, the authors restricted 
the set of patents to all patents pledged prior to 
July 2010, which excludes the four patent families 
pledged by Hewlett-Packard and Hitachi.21 The 
authors also included the original control patents, 
which had been obtained by matching on priority 
year, IPC subclass and publication authority.
Updating the data turned out to be somewhat 
complicated, partly because the original data 
was drawn from a European Patent Office (EPO) 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) 
version with non-permanent identifiers, and partly 
because PATSTAT itself changes over time, with 
some data disappearing due to changes in data 
at the contributing national or regional patent 
offices. In addition, the list of patents on the EcoPC 
website appears to have changed slightly, to some 
extent in response to the authors’ comments on the 
original list (incorrect numbers, etc.). The authors 
used the April 2017 PATSTAT version and identified 
a correspondence between the prior identifying 
numbers and the permanent (as of April 2011) 
identifiers using information on the application 
number and authority of the relevant patents. In 
a few cases, the authors were unable to find the 
application number/authority combination on 
the new version of PATSTAT. There were four such 
applications from the Japan Patent Office (JPO), 
which apparently have been withdrawn and are no 
21 In the case of the Hitachi patent, it is not clear that the patent was ever 
listed on the EcoPC’s public website. All versions of the EcoPC’s list of 
patents that the authors were able to locate using web archive tools were 
current only as of May 2011, prior to Hitachi’s joining.
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longer on its website.22 The authors included them 
in their forward citation analysis as having zero 
cites, for completeness. In addition, 24 applications 
from the Australian Patent Office (APO) were 
reduced to 12 applications in the new PATSTAT file. 
The resulting data set contains 698 applications 
rather than the original 711, with the following 
distribution: From Table 2, one can see that 
although the set of applications has changed 
slightly, the same number of equivalent groups 
for the patents have to be analyzed. It is also 
clear that the number of citations to both the 
EcoPC patents and the controls have grown 
considerably, more than doubling in both cases.
22 One problem with searching for JPO patents, especially the earlier ones, 
is that the numbering systems are quite complex and some numbers are 
apparently reused occasionally (for further information on Japanese 
patent numbering, see Prior Art, “Tips of Performing Japanese Patent 
Numbers Search”, online: <www.searchpriorart.com/search_tips/patent_
no_search.htm>). This problem leads to apparent errors on the Espacenet 
and Google patents websites. The authors also found that at least two of 
the equivalent patents they had identified for the controls became utility 
model patents when they were granted in Japan. 
Empirical Results
Next, the authors used the data on patents 
pledged to the EcoPC and their matched controls 
to analyze, first, the legal status of EcoPC patents, 
to gauge whether member companies considered 
continued ownership of their pledged patents 
as sufficiently important to incur the associated 
costs, and, second, the diffusion of the technologies 
protected by patents pledged to the EcoPC, as 
measured by citations received from other patents.
Legal Status of the Pledged Patents
The authors began by looking at the legal status 
of the EcoPC pledged patents as of July 2017, 
summarized in Table 3. This data was collected 
from PATSTAT’s legal status tables from April 
2017 and supplemented with information from 
web searches. The World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Patent Cooperation Treaty 
patents in the authors’ database do not have a 
post-grant legal status since they are granted on a 
national basis, and a few patent applications from 
the JPO could not be found, probably because 
the PATSTAT entries were for translations, or they 
were utility model applications in Japan, even 
though they might have been patent applications 
elsewhere. There are 15 such patents for which 
the authors do not have legal status either, or 
legal status is meaningless. Of the remaining 221 
patent applications, almost 20 percent of the 90 
priority patents were still in force as of July 2017, 
Table 2: Data Set Construction
Old (2011 Data) New (2017 Data)
Number of Applications 711 698
Controls 473 461
Eco-patents 238 237
Number of Equivalence Groups 184 184
Controls 94 94
Eco-patents 90 90
Number of Citations 1,872 4,056
Controls 1,205 2,713
Eco-patents 667 1,343
Source: Authors.
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but only 11 percent of all the equivalent patents 
were still in force. Of the 27 patents still in force or 
pending, 12 are US patents, six are Japanese, four 
are European Patent or German, and the remainder 
are Chinese (one), Russian (two), Mexican (one) 
and Korean (one). Almost half the patents have 
expired for nonpayment of fees, although almost 
as many expired at the end of their terms.  
Figure 1  shows the distribution of patent 
lifetimes (approximated by the lapse [expiration 
or nonpayment] dates minus the application 
filing date).23 In the case of patents still in force, 
the authors measured the lifetime to July 2017. 
The distribution is fairly flat for those patents 
that did not remain in force for their full terms. 
Figure 2 breaks down the different reasons why 
patents lapsed. It shows that a significant number 
of patents have expired since 2007. A few patents 
were rejected by the relevant patent offices or 
were withdrawn by applicants, but the majority 
lapsed due to nonpayment of renewal fees.
Table 4 (right) shows the geographic coverage of 
the EcoPC patents. Ninety percent of the priority 
23 Most offices now have a common patent term of 20 years from filing date, 
but there are various exceptions, and older patents in the authors’ sample 
may have been issued under different rules. When the authors were able to 
obtain the actual expiration date, they used that (in most cases).
patent applications were made to the four most 
important jurisdictions: the United States, Germany, 
Japan and the EPO, and these jurisdictions account 
for 80 percent of the patents overall. There is very 
little evidence that the patents in the commons 
ever covered less-developed countries. The only 
patents in middle-income countries are in Brazil 
(seven), Mexico (four) and Argentina (one), and 
there are none in low-income countries. So, 
patents cannot have been an obstacle to the use of 
these technologies in less-developed countries. 
Technology Diffusion and 
Follow-on Innovation
Next, the authors re-examine the question of 
technology diffusion by looking at the updated 
citation data. Table 5, below, shows the authors’ 
updated version of data from Table 6 in Hall and 
Helmers (2013). As indicated earlier, there are 
slightly fewer equivalents of the EcoPC patents and 
controls due to missing data and the consolidation 
at the APO. The share of patents that have citations 
has increased, approaching close to 90 percent for 
the equivalence groups, and the average citations 
per equivalence group have more than doubled. 
None of these results are unexpected, given the 
additional five years of data, as well as probable 
improvements in the PATSTAT coverage itself.  
Table 3: Legal Status of Eco-patents — July 2017
All Priority All Priority
Pending 8 3 3.4% 3.3%
Granted and in Force 19 14 8.1% 15.6%
Total Still Active 27 17 11.4% 18.9%
Nonpayment of Fees 90 29 38.1% 32.2%
Expired at Term 61 30 25.8% 33.3%
Rejected 18 7 7.6% 7.8%
Withdrawn 24 7 10.2% 7.8%
Total Not Active 193 73 81.8% 81.1%
Missing (from JPO)* 5 0 2.1% 0.0%
WIPO Applications 11 0 4.7% 0.0%
Total 236 90
* These appear to be translation entries or utility models. 
Source: Authors.
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Figure 1: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Patent Life in Years
In force 
patents
Lapsed 
patents
Source: Authors.
Figure 2: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017)
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Table 6 and Figure 3, below, show the key results 
of the authors’ new analysis. The results are 
essentially the same as in the authors’ 2013 paper, 
but much more precisely estimated. Poisson 
and negative binomial models of citations at the 
patent level show that EcoPC patents are half 
as likely to be cited as the controls (an elasticity 
of 0.4–0.6), and even less likely after donation, 
although this last result is only marginally 
significant. These regressions control for both 
priority year and the citation lag using dummies. 
The Jaffe-Trajtenberg model of citation decline 
and diffusion (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1999), 
shown in the final three columns of Table 3, 
uses a parametric model for the citation lag 
that is given by the following equation:
Where t is the priority year of the cited patent, 
s is the citation lag and cst is the citation rate 
(the number of citations at that lag per sample 
patents available to be cited). f(t) is modelled as 
a set of priority year dummies. That is, the unit 
of observation is the average cites per patents 
with a given priority year, citation lag and patent 
type (EcoPC patent before and after or control). 
Prior experience with this specification suggests 
that although it is an appealing model in that it 
captures both the initial increase in citation due 
to knowledge diffusion and the decline due to 
knowledge age, it is quite difficult to estimate 
successfully (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001). The 
authors accomplish this in two ways: non-linear 
least squares with a dependent variable equal 
to average cites per patent; and Poisson with a 
dependent variable equal to the total cites at the 
given lag to patents with a given priority year. In 
the latter case, the authors multiply the right side 
of the model by the number of patents, so the 
models are equivalent. The results from the two 
estimation strategies are similar. Once the authors 
impose a model on the citation lag, the EcoPC 
patents are cited an average of 25 percent less than 
the controls, and there is no change after donation. 
The decay (obsolescence) and diffusion parameters 
are similar to those obtained by Hall et al (2001) for 
the US patent data, with obsolescence increasing 
by about five percent per year, and diffusion by 
about 50 percent. However, keep in mind that 
one reason the first parameter is relatively low 
and the second relatively high is that there is a 
secular growth in citation that is not completely 
captured by the priority year dummies. That is, this 
model imposes a fixed citation lag structure on the 
data, which is then allowed to be higher or lower, 
depending on priority year and EcoPC status.
Table 6 and Figure 3 show that there is little 
change in aggregate citation differences between 
EcoPC patents and controls before and after 
being pledged to the commons, although EcoPC 
patents are cited less overall. One thing that is 
important to remember, however, is that because 
the pledging firms retain a defensive termination 
right, there may be continuing innovation building 
on these patents that does not result in new patent 
applications (and citations). That is, there are limits 
created on the enforcement of patent rights by the 
Table 4: Application Authority Distribution
Authority Priorities All
United States 34 75
Germany 20 45
Japan 17 34
EPO 10 34
South Korea 2 7
China 2 3
Austria 1 4
Spain 1 4
United Kingdom 1 2
Norway 1 2
Denmark 1 1
Brazil 7
Canada 7
Mexico 4
Australia 1
Russia 2
Argentina 1
France 1
Hong Kong 1
Israel 1
Total 90 237
Source: Authors.
cst = b0(1 + deco Deco + dafter Dafter ) f (t) 
   exp[- b1(1 + ble Deco)s] [1 - (b2(1+b2e Deco)s)]+est
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Table 5: Citation Counts for EcoPC Patents and Controls
All Patents Equivalence 
Group
All Patents Equivalence 
Group
All Patents
Total Patents Share with Citations Total Citations
Eco-patents 237 90 73.0% 85.6% 1,343
Controls 461 94 57.1% 93.6% 2,713
Average Citations* Average Citations**
Eco-patents 10.5 17.4 5.7 14.9
Controls 13.2 30.8 5.9 28.9
Total 236 90
Citations are measured as all forward citations in the patent literature between the application date and April/May 2017, 
adjusted for citations by equivalent patents in other jurisdictions.  
* Average over patents with nonzero citations. 
** Average over all patents
Source: Authors
Table 6: Estimation of Citation Lag Models
Model Semi-parametric Jaffe-Trajtenberg
Dependent Variable  
Method
Cites  
Poisson
Cites Negative 
Binomial
Cites/Patent 
NLLS
Cites  
Poisson
Cites 
Poisson
EcoPC Patents -0.60 (0.11)*** -0.42 (0.10)*** -0.33 (0.09)*** -0.22 (0.04)*** -0.25 (0.05)***
EcoPC Patents 
after Donation
-0.35 (0.21) -0.33 (0.17)* -0.10 (0.18) -0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08)
Decay Parameter 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)***
Diffusion Parameter 0.49 (0.21)** 0.76 (0.19)*** 0.64 (0.21)***
EcoPC Decay 0.47 (0.38)
Dispersion Parameter 3.21 (0.17)***
Citations Lag Dummies yes yes no no no
Priority Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 
Log Likelihood
3,071 
-6,143.0
3,071 
-3,745.2
518 
-845.6
518 
12,062.8
518 
12,068.6
Sample: 94 controls and 90 EcoPC patents with priority years between 1992 and 2005 and citing years between 1992 
and 2016. The unit of observation in the first two columns is a priority patent-citing year and in the next three columns 
a priority year-citing year. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significant at the one per cent (***), five per 
cent (**) and 10 percent (*) levels.
Source: Authors.
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Figure 3: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017)
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Table 7: Citation to the Eco-patents by Citer Type
Unweighted Weighted
Firm Before 
Donation
After  
Donation
Share  
Before
Share  
After
Before 
Donation
After  
Donation
Share  
Before
Before 
Donation
Self-citation 141 24 9.9% 4.6% 127.1 12.9 12.3% 3.9%
Other Eco-
patent Firm
11 13 0.8% 2.5% 8.0 7.3 0.8% 2.2%
Other Firm 645 248 45.1% 47.1% 627.5 229.8 60.5% 68.8%
Individual 589 219 41.2% 41.6% 243.0 71.7 23.4% 21.5%
Institution 43 22 3.0% 4.2% 31.7 12.4 3.1% 3.7%
Total 1,429 526 1,037.3 334.1
These totals are for cites to the contributed eco-patents only. Weighted cites are weighted according to the number of 
applicants.
Source: Authors.
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firms that use the technologies in these patents, 
which may reduce the benefits of subsequent 
patenting, and thus reduce citations to the pledged 
patent. This issue is related to a broader problem: the 
authors’ analysis of diffusion only looks for diffusion 
that leads to follow-on innovation that is patented. 
This excludes simple use of pledged patented 
technologies and even of follow-on innovation if 
it does not lead to a patent filing. However, in the 
absence of any information on the use of pledged 
patents (see the discussion above), the forward 
citation analysis offers an opportunity to assess 
the impact of the patent pledge on diffusion. 
It is also possible that the nature of the citation 
changes, in that the technology in the patents 
becomes more useful to individuals and non-
profit institutions, given the absence of royalty 
requirements. The authors investigate this question 
by looking at the source of the citations to the EcoPC 
patents and controls before and after donation. 
They divide the cites into five groupings according 
to their source: self-citations from the firm that 
owns the pledged patent, citations from other 
EcoPC participants, citations from other firms, 
citations from individual patentees, and citations 
from non-profit institutions (universities, hospitals, 
public research organizations and governments). 
The authors then define the before and after 
period for each grouping of citations according 
to the relation between the earliest priority date 
for the citing patent and the date the cited patent 
was donated to the commons. The results are 
shown in Table 7. In some cases, sample sizes 
are fairly small, but it appears that self-citation 
falls relative to all the other categories, with the 
largest (percentage) increases in citations by other 
EcoPC participants and non-profit institutions. 
One issue that arises when counting the source 
of citations is that many patents have multiple 
applicants of different types. Given the non-rivalry 
of knowledge, which implies that one citer’s use of 
the knowledge in a patent does not depend on use 
by another citer, it might be appropriate to simply 
count all the applicant citations as citations (as in 
the first panel of Table 6). Nevertheless, the authors 
also show a weighted version of the table in the 
second panel, where the weights are proportional to 
the inverse of the number of applicants on the citing 
patent.24 Although the distribution of cites changes 
dramatically when the authors weight, due to the 
tendency of individuals to share in applications, 
the qualitative conclusions with respect to the 
post-commons citing behaviour are the same. 
Conclusion: Lessons for a 
(Green) Patent Commons
The authors summarize here what they have 
learned from the experience of this patent commons 
and related work on knowledge transfer.
 → The EcoPC was conceived and implemented by 
the suppliers of technology without consulting 
the demand side (potential users of these 
patents/technologies). As such, the EcoPC was 
constructed in a way that was not easy for users 
to consume. More outreach and technology 
transfer assistance is probably needed, or 
perhaps a way to simply tell potential users 
about the technologies that are available (other 
than a passive website with patent listings).25
 → Related to the previous point, the EcoPC was 
organized as a volunteer effort. Members paid 
no fees, and the WBCSD and the ELI participated 
largely as an accommodation to IBM. Without 
payment, there are not likely to be many ancillary 
value-added services. This being said, some 
members stated that they would not have joined 
had they been required to pay a membership fee. 
So, there is a clear trade-off, or perhaps a need for 
public support or a tax incentive, if the activity is 
viewed as socially desirable. This also means that 
the ability to distribute the fixed costs associated 
with managing such an institution favours an 
approach that brings together a larger number 
of participating companies than the EcoPC did.
 → Low membership can be attributed, in part, to 
the cost of the internal patent analysis that was 
24 The authors removed individual inventor applicants where there was also 
a firm applicant before computing the weights, on the grounds that these 
applicants usually are employed by the firm in question.
25 A similar supply-side model for patents can be found in the IPXI Exchange, 
an attempt to offer unitized licences of pooled patents essential to certain 
industry standards. Like the EcoPC, the IPXI failed to achieve significant 
take-up and eventually discontinued its operations. See Contreras (2016).
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required to contribute. Several of the original 
EcoPC participants were large, sophisticated 
organizations with internal patent analytical 
resources and a clear understanding of 
which patents would, or would not, advance 
corporate goals. Did other firms feel that they 
did not want to risk giving away a patent 
that could have potential value? Or was the 
internal effort of identifying these patents, 
without a clear payoff, seen as not worth 
the effort for overworked patent counsel?
 → Low membership in the EcoPC may also be 
attributable to the lack of a formal membership 
recruitment campaign, which is likely due to 
the lack of any independent funding for the 
EcoPC. Most trade associations have dedicated 
personnel for membership development, 
and enrolling members takes significant 
time and effort.26 Without these resources, it 
is not surprising that the EcoPC was unable 
to recruit a larger body of members.
 → The most common critique of the EcoPC was its 
lack of tracking of patent utilization. Without 
knowledge of how or whether patents were being 
utilized, companies could not justify expending 
further effort on the activity. Moreover, even 
the PR benefit of belonging to the EcoPC waned 
after the initial contributions, given that there 
were no “success stories” to promote. More 
generally, the lack of information on usage meant 
that it was very difficult to gauge the success 
of the initiative and to make adjustments to 
its structure and management to improve its 
performance. Finally, the lack of demonstrable 
results from the project eroded the potential PR 
benefits that member firms may have hoped 
to achieve from participation in the EcoPC.
 → Effective technology diffusion requires more 
than patent non-assertion, especially in the 
developing world. Technical assistance and 
know-how are essential for environmental 
technologies far more than they are for software 
or pharmaceuticals (Barton et al. 2002; McManis 
and Contreras, 2014). Patent disclosures 
alone are not sufficient to enable someone to 
implement a technology (see Ouellette [2012] 
for the results of a survey of patent readers).
26 Ibid, relating to the failed IPXI effort.
 → Several interview respondents expressed 
disappointment with a general trend within 
the industry and their own companies to less 
aggressively pursue ESR goals and programs 
over the course of the EcoPC project. This 
trend, which the authors have only anecdotal 
evidence to support, may have contributed to 
the lack of enrolment of new members in the 
EcoPC. If this is the case, then new commons 
efforts in the environmental space will need 
to develop strategies to rekindle corporate 
interest in ESR and green technology solutions.
 → The results of the empirical analysis suggest 
fairly strongly that the technologies covered 
by the contributed patents were in fact not 
very valuable, even before contribution to 
the commons. In addition to the citation 
evidence, this view is supported by the fall off 
in inquiries from others. These observations 
suggest that future commons efforts may 
benefit from the contribution of patents that 
have a greater inherent value, at least to the 
markets that they are intended to benefit, and 
that contributors may benefit the commons 
by more specifically identifying potential 
applications for contributed patents. 
Future initiatives seeking to make green 
technologies more widely available should consider 
the lessons learned from the EcoPC. There are 
clear trade-offs between costs and benefits that 
organizers of future efforts need to consider. The 
experience of the EcoPC, even though it may not 
have fully realized its ambitious goals, has helped 
to advance our understanding of how patent 
commons can work and fail to work. As such, 
the EcoPC has made an undeniable contribution 
to the study of patent commons and pledges.
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